Abstract: We consider a market for pollution emission permits in a model in which pollution, generated as by-product of firm's activity, is determined as the sum of firm-specific random shocks and each firm's abatement effort. In such a setting, an expected utility maximizing society demands an efficient abatement effort from each firm. We assume that the abatement effort is decided by each firm and is not observed by the environmental regulator. This leads to a moral hazard problem between firms (agents) and the regulator (principal). The regulator assigns contracts to each firm, each contract consisting of an amount of permits and a linear fine for over-polluting firms. We distinguish those policies where the regulator assigns a low number of permits (restrictive policies) and policies where the number of permits to distribute is high (permissive policies). We show that in a context of restrictive policies there exist policies that achieve efficiency and do not need to discriminate in terms of penalties among overpolluting firms when a market for permits is allowed to operate. We also find that the regulator can set up policies with low penalty levels for almost all firms. Finally, we show that in a context of permissive policies, the market leads to the same efficiency-inducing fine scheme than the corresponding one under autarky.
Introduction
The use of tradeable emission permits as a mechanism to comply with environmental standards has steadily increased over the recent years to become a central issue for the design of environmental policies worldwide. One of the leading examples is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), launched at 1 January 2005 with the aim of helping EU Member States achieve their commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in a costeffective way. It is the first international trading system for CO 2 emissions in the world and as of 1 January 2008, coinciding with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, it applies not only to the 27 EU Member States but also to the other three members of the European Economic Area.
Allowing participating companies to buy or sell emission permits means that emission cuts can be achieved at a lower cost. The efficiency-improving character of a market for emission permits is well established in the environmental economic literature (see Springer (2003) for a survey of studies of the global market for tradeable GHG emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol). The basic explanation is the following: if emissions are deterministic, that is, fully determined by the decisions of polluting firms, then the level of emissions is the target variable of the environmental policy. In this context, since an efficient environmental policy requires achieving the socially optimal total amount of emissions in a way that emissions are distributed among the polluting firms in a cost-effective way, then, for any initial allocation of emission permits chosen by an environmental regulator (ER), a subsequent competitive market for permits leads to a cost-effective re-distribution of permits among polluting firms.
In contrast to this approach, we assume that emissions are stochastic. More concretely, we consider that the level of emissions of a polluting firm is jointly determined by firm's abatement effort (which is a firm's decision) and a firmspecific random shock, which is not observed by the firm at the time of exerting the abatement effort. In this setting, an expected utility maximizing society defines the abatement effort rather than emissions as the target variable. 1 Another important issue of our analysis is that whereas individual emissions are assumed to be observed by the ER, abatement effort is not. This assumption is important, since environmental policies designed by the ER on an allowancefine basis are necessarily contingent on the set of observable variables.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a first step in the analysis of the moral hazard problem that arises in a context of tradeable emission permits when emissions are stochastic. We focus on a moral hazard problem with a single principal and multiple agents, the ER and the polluting firms, respectively. In order to clarify the moral hazard nature, let us detail the timing of events. First, the ER assigns contracts to each polluting firm. A contract is an endowment of permits and a fine for over-polluting firms with respect to the post-market holdings of permits (individual emissions are observed by the ER). Second, firms trade permits in a competitive market and decide the abatement effort. Finally, shocks are realized, emissions are observed by the ER, and payoffs take place according to the post-market holdings of permits. It is important to note that abatement effort is the society's target variable and it is not observable by the ER, which, together with the fact that no further decisions are taken after shocks are realized, leads to a pure moral hazard problem.
In our framework, once the contracts are initially assigned by the principal, agents can partially trade contracts among them at their own convenience. 2 From this perspective, it is not obvious whether a competitive market for emission permits, that takes place after the initial assignment chosen by the ER, helps to induce the socially optimal abatement efforts on each polluting firm. In short, the aim of the paper is to propose a model that is able to provide insights into the effects that the introduction of a market for permits can have on the environmental policies that lead to efficient outcomes in this moral hazard context. As far as we are aware, this link among agents created by the market for permits in a moral hazard context is novel within the literature and constitutes the main interest of this paper from a theoretical point of view.
Moral hazard problems in environmental economics have been studied in the previous literature. Whenever there are multiple agents, this literature assumes connections among them which differ from the one considered in this paper. In particular, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982) analyze a team production problem, where the observable outcome is joint production. Also, Mookherjee (1984) considers a different connection among agents, assuming that the effort of a single agent influences other agent's production. Related to this, Hölmstrom (1979) considers the existence of common-to-all agents' shocks, where one agent's production might be statistically informative about other agent's effort. Xepapadeas (1991) studies a dynamic model of incentives in a moral hazard situation and proposes instruments (subsidies and fines) to be applied in situations where there exists imperfect information. The moral hazard problem in his paper arises, because the individual emission levels (or abatement efforts) are not observable while the outcome of all the polluting agents combined efforts is observable. Instead, we consider a model where agents are only connected through the possibility of trading emission permits. Among others, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) analyze an optimal audit policy in a model of environmental taxes, and Wainwright (1999) studies enforcement of environmental policies in a situation of asymmetric information. Contrarily to these works, and in order to focus on the effects of the introduction of an emission permits market, we assume that there is no monitoring on efforts and that the tax policy is perfectly enforceable.
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Concerning the assumption that emissions are stochastic, some previous works that deal with this assumption are Plourde and Yeung (1989) and Segerson (1986) and, more closely related to this paper, Hennessy and Roosen (1999) and Innes (2003) . These authors present reasons for which pollution might be partially determined by firm-specific shocks. For instance, random variations on the input quality in production processes might revert in variations in the pollution level, and this is arguably a firm-specific effect. 4 We postulate that when each firm takes a decision on abatement effort (or operates in the permits market) it cannot fully anticipate this effect. Ellerman and Joskow (2008) report periods of high price volatility in markets for emission permits which corroborate this assumption. Although they deal with stochastic pollution, on the one hand, Hennessy and Roosen (1999) focus on the incentives to merge, and, on the other hand, Innes (2003) analyzes a problem of banking -transfer across periods -permits. Moreover, in this latter paper, both the firm and the ER have the chance to take decisions once uncertainty is solved, which constitutes a major difference with respect to a moral hazard problem. Another important issue of this paper is that it allows us to analyze and compare the effects of introducing a market for permits under two different types of environmental policies. The question is not whether it is possible to achieve efficiency in abatement efforts, but to analyze the type of contracts that achieve this efficiency. As we have already mentioned, each contract consists of some amount of permits together with a linear fine for over-polluting firms with respect to the final holdings of permits. The ER might want to set firm-specific contracts, since we allow firms to differ in the productivity of their abatement technologies and those differences are known by the ER. We consider a competitive market in which the price is endogenously determined in our model. We show that there is a continuum of efficiency-inducing contracts, from fewpermits-low-fine contracts to many-permits-high-fine contracts. We consider two extreme cases: a restrictive policy, when the ER distributes a low amount of permits, and a permissive policy, when the number of permits that the ER assigns is large. We show that the differences between an autarky scenario, when there is no possibility of trading permits, and the market scenario, where firms can partially trade their contracts, depend crucially on whether the ER adopts a restrictive or a permissive policy.
Let us start considering that the ER opts for assigning a low amount of permits (low is precisely defined in the paper), that is, the ER undertakes a restrictive policy. Since firms differ in their abatement technologies, the society optimally demands different abatement efforts across firms. Consequently, the ER at the autarky scenario must discriminate among them by assigning firmspecific fine parameters. Instead, we show that when a market for permits is allowed to operate in this context, the market itself acts as a discriminating mechanism among firms, which allows the ER to implement a simpler (compared to the autarky scenario) profile of efficiency-inducing contracts in which all firms face the same penalty parameter. In other words, if the ER opts for a restrictive policy, it becomes irrelevant if the information about the productivity of the abatement technologies is private information to the firms.
5 Moreover, when a market for permits exists, the ER still might opt for a restrictive policy and select a profile of efficiency-inducing contracts with firm-specific penalty parameters. In that case, we show that there exists a profile of efficiencyinducing contracts such that all firms but one would face lower penalty parameters compared to the corresponding ones at the autarky case. When moving to permissive policies, the market for permits does not simplify the efficiency-inducing contracts with respect to the autarky case. Note that the market for permits is an instrument for the firms, not for the ER, and so each firm uses it on his own profit. This fact becomes more relevant as the potential volume of trade (the amount of permits assigned by the ER) increases. As the amount of permits increases, the discrimination among firms performed by the market becomes less necessary, since the ER can discriminate with her initial assignment of permits. As an illustrative case, we show that for an initial assignment of permits given by historical emissions, which is a rather natural -and widely used -discrimination form concerning the permits, the profile of efficiency-inducing penalty parameters under autarky is not firm specific. Additionally, the profile of efficiency-inducing penalty parameters when there exists a market for permits mimics the one under autarky. The explanation of this result within an agency theory framework is standard. Roughly, if we let the ER's strategy space be large enough (i.e. she assigns as many permits as desired), the ER can fully induce efficiency with that instrument and does not need any additional instrument (fines) and captures any surplus that the firms (agents) might obtain at the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the efficient allocation. In Section 4, we study efficiency-restoring environmental policies at the autarky and at the market scenario. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are left to the Appendix.
The model
We consider an economy composed of a finite number I of polluting firms. The set of firms is denoted by χ ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; I f g , and generic firms will be denoted by i and j. Each firm is freely endowed with one perfectly divisible unit of resource that can be allocated either to some profitable activity or to abatement effort. The pollution level generated by firm i 2 χ is
where m i is the amount of resource allocated to the profitable activity, which as a side-effect generates the amount of pollution m i , and a i is abatement effort. Each firm must satisfy the resource constraint: m i þ a i 1. The abatement technology is represented by a function, g, which maps abatement effort into pollution reduction and it is assumed to be twice differentiable with g 0 > 0, g 00 0 and g 0 ð Þ ¼ 0. Furthermore, " i is a firm-specific random shock, and λ i is a firm-specific parameter that refers to the efficiency in reducing pollution. Given any two firms i and j, we say that firm i is environmentally more efficient than firm j iff λ i > λ j . In order to focus on asymmetries due to these efficiency levels, we assume that " i is i.i.d. across firms, with density function f, being " inf ; " sup Â Ã its support, with expectation μ ¼ E " i f g. 6 We also assume that the support is such that Pr e i > 0 ð Þ¼1 holds for every i and every pair m i ; a i ð Þ. This is equivalent to
Let f denote the function that maps m i into firm's profit. We assume that f is twice differentiable with f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0 and f 0 ð Þ ¼ 0. The global level of pollution causes a damage to other agents different than the polluting firms. Let the global level of pollution be denoted by e, that is, e ¼ P i2χ e i . The social damage is w e ð Þ ¼ exp δ e ð Þ, where δ is some positive parameter. Thus, the society as a whole is risk averse with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, being δ the CARA parameter.
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The efficient allocation of the economy is a pair of vectors m o ; a o ð Þwhich maximizes the total profit minus the expected social damage. Formally, the efficient allocation solves
There exists an ER, who decides and imposes the environmental policy. Her objective is to induce each firm to choose its corresponding part of the efficient allocation m o ; a o ð Þ. The problem of the ER is that she cannot observe -and thus enforce directly -each firm's internal allocation of resources. Instead, she observes and bases the environmental policy on each firm's individual emissions. 9 The timing of the game is as follows. First, the ER sets up the environmental policy, which consists of a set of firm-specific contracts, where each contract specifies an amount of permits and a linear fine in case of overpollution. Second, firms are allowed to trade pollution permits in a competitive market. Third, firms decide their internal allocation of resource. Finally, shocks are realized, individual emissions are observed by the ER and payoffs take place according to the post-market holdings of permits and the fines.
7 In other words, the society is sensitive not only to the ex-ante expected pollution level but also to ex-ante risk in the level of pollution. The CARA assumption implies that society's aversion to environmental risk is independent of society's wealth.
We omit non-negativity constraints of the decision variables throughout the text. Essentially, eq.
[1] is a particular case of the model studied in Innes (2003) . Consequently, the choice variables in the problem that defines the efficient allocation in his paper are the same as here. As mentioned in Section 1, he does not analyze a moral hazard problem. 9 Since each firm's pollution is observable, we deal with a point-source pollution problem.
Moral Hazard and Tradeable Pollution Emission Permits
Formally, the environmental policy is a set of I piecewise linear penalty functions, each one of them characterized by a pair q Ã i ; θ i À Á , whose entries are non-negative, such that the penalty paid by firm i once e i is observed is
In words, the first q Ã i units of pollution of firm i are free of charge and constitute the firm's assignment of permits by the ER, whereas the firm pays a fine θ i for each unit exceeding q Ã i . Sometimes we refer to the pair q Ã i ; θ i À Á as an environmental policy for firm i. We assume that the penalty paid by the firms does not revert to any third party.
If firms are allowed to trade permits among themselves at a market, then the penalty paid by firm i is
where q i corresponds to firm i post-market holdings of permits. We assume that the emission permits market is competitive. The market price is endogenous in our analysis. The market clearing condition is X
where the right-hand side is the supply and it is decided by the ER, whereas the left-hand side is the demand and it is decided by the firms. Let us explain further how demand is obtained. Analogously to society's preferences, we assume that firms are risk averse with CARA utility function, although firms' risk aversion parameter may differ from society's. 10 In addition, let p denote the price of the permits. The net payment of firm i at the market is p q i À q Ã i À Á , which can be either positive or negative depending on firm's position (buyer or seller). Therefore, the expected profit of firm i; once firms have decided their internal allocation of resource, transactions at the market have taken place and before shocks are realized is
where ρ > 0 is the firm's (constant) absolute risk aversion parameter, assumed common to all firms. Each firm selects simultaneously the vector q i ; m i ; a i ð Þ , that is, a position at the market and an internal allocation of resource, to maximize his expected profit π i given by eq. [3].
Since the internal allocation of resource of each firm is not observed by the ER, firms have an informational advantage that leads to a moral hazard problem, where the regulator plays as principal, each firm plays as an agent and each firm-specific penalty function set up by the regulator is an individual contract. The main interest of this paper from a purely theoretical standpoint is that the emission permits market allows the agents to trade partially their contracts (specifically, the permits) after they are assigned by the principal. This trade constitutes the only link among agents in our model. In fact, without an emission permits market, the analysis is equivalent to I independent principalagent models.
Let us add a final remark concerning the informational structure of the model. We deal with a moral hazard problem, since the ER cannot observe the abatement effort exerted by firms and the abatement effort is the target variable of the ER. In order to isolate the effects of this asymmetry of information between the firms and the ER, we make two essential assumptions. First, the random shocks are realized once firms have taken decisions. Second, the firmspecific parameter is known by the ER. These two assumptions imply that no firm has private information regarding its type when they take a decision, which otherwise would constitute an adverse selection problem.
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The efficient allocation
In this section, we characterize the efficient allocation of resources of the economy, that is, the allocation that the ER wants to induce on firms. Notice that, since f is a strictly increasing function, no resources are wasted at the efficient solution, that is, m i þ a i ¼ 1 holds for every i 2 χ at the efficient allocation. Moreover, since g is monotone, finding z i ¼ gða i Þ is equivalent to finding a i . In conclusion, the internal allocation of resources in firm i is fully characterized by z i . For some of the proofs, it is convenient to use the inverse function of g, which we denote by γ.
11 Studying this adverse selection problem is an interesting extension of the model proposed in this paper. In Section 4, we characterize settings in which adding an adverse selection problem would be irrelevant since we prove that the ER does not need the information about the λ's to induce the efficient allocation. For the rest of the cases, our results open a line of research where one should add an adverse selection problem and study the type of contracts that the ER should design in order to induce efficiency. 
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Proposition 1 (i) The (interior) efficient allocation is characterized by
(ii) At any efficient allocation, the environmentally more efficient firms exert a larger abatement effort, that is,
for any i and j in χ.
We observe that, given the assumption on society's risk aversion, the efficient abatement effort of each firm depends on aggregate magnitudes, specifically, it depends on the expected level of aggregate pollution conditional on the socially optimal firms' abatement effort. It is straightforward to show that in a risk neutral society, the efficient abatement effort of each firm is independent of the rest of the industry. In addition, the left-hand side of eq.
[4] is the marginal rate of transformation of the profitable activity in terms of pollution abatement. As expected, the previous result imposes that such rate must be equal across firms at any efficient allocation. Part (ii) of the proposition presents a straightforward implication of eq.
[4].
Efficiency-inducing environmental policies
In this section, we study environmental policies that induce each firm to select the efficient allocation of resource. Our primary concern is to isolate the effect that a market for permits has on the efficiency-inducing environmental policy.
To that purpose, we compare that policy when firms are allowed to trade permits (market scenario) with the corresponding efficiency-inducing policy when there is no market for permits (autarky scenario). A comment on the ER's excess of instruments is in order. Consider an economy composed of a single polluting firm. The environmental policy is a pair ðq Ã ; θÞ, which defines some amount of permits, q Ã , and a piecewise linear penalty with parameter θ. Obviously, with just one firm there is no room for inter-firms trading after the policy is fixed. Generally, the ER will have a continuum of efficiency-inducing pairs: the lower the amount of permits, the lower θ. Our purpose is to be as exhaustive as possible on this issue. To this end, we first present general properties of any efficiency-inducing environmental policy. We analyze in detail two extreme policies: a policy in which the ER is restrictive with respect to the permits (restrictive policy) and a policy in which the ER is permissive regarding the permits (permissive policy). Both policies will be precisely defined below.
General properties
The aim of this subsection is to illustrate that our model delivers reasonable predictions on how the efficiency-inducing environmental policies should be, either in the autarky or in the market scenario. In further subsections, we deal with the comparison of those policies in both scenarios for the above-mentioned extreme policies.
Autarky
In this setting, the ER assigns emission permits to the firms and there is no possibility of trading permits thereafter. Given an arbitrary environmental policy ðq Ã i ; θ i Þ for a generic firm i, the problem that firm i solves is
Note that the objective function is the expected profit of the firm when q Ã i ¼ q i . Using a similar reasoning to the efficient problem, m i þ a i ¼ 1 holds for every i 2 χ, and we take z as the decision variable of the firm. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 Consider an arbitrary firm i 2 χ and an environmental policy ðq Ã i ; θ i Þ. In an autarky scenario, where no permits can be traded: (i) The optimal decision of firm i is characterized by the following first-order condition
The following properties hold: (ii.1) The abatement effort of firm i increases with θ i and decreases with q Moral Hazard and Tradeable Pollution Emission Permits positive probability of over-polluting, and, thus, of paying a fine despite it undertakes the efficient abatement effort; (ii.3) There exists a continuous and increasing function ¡ such that any environmental policy q
Part (i) characterizes the optimal decisions of the firm. Part (ii) presents some properties which are straightforward if we compare the optimal decision of the firms with the expressions obtained in Proposition 1. Finally, part (iii) formalizes our previous comment on the excess of instruments.
The emission permits market
Let us introduce the possibility of trading permits among firms. First, we consider each firm's decision problem. Given an environmental policy q Ã i ; θ i À Á for firm i, the firm selects q i ; m i ; a i ð Þin order to maximize π i , as defined in eq.
[3], with eventually q Ã i Þq i . In the same way as for the autarky case, we conclude that the resource constraint is binding at equilibrium, and therefore, m i þ a i ¼ 1 holds, thus we can take m i ¼ 1 À γ z i ð Þ and reduce the decision variables to z i and q i .
Proposition 3 Consider a competitive market for permits and a generic firm i with an environmental policy q
Then: (i) The optimal decision of firm i is characterized by the following pair of first-order conditions
The market induces the efficient allocation if and only if the market price is
Thus, the efficiency-inducing market price increases linearly with the expected level of aggregate pollution conditional on firms' abatement effort, that is, E ejz f g. This linear function shifts upward and becomes steeper as society's risk aversion, δ, increases. In other words, our model predicts that an emission permits market whose price does not react to changes in the aggregate level of pollution cannot restore the efficient allocation.
The following proposition presents some comparative statics results and provides some insights into each firm's position (seller or buyer) in the market.
Proposition 4 If firms can trade permits in a competitive market, the following is verified: (i) z i increases with p, i.e. each firm increases its own abatement effort when the price of the permits increases; (ii) q i decreases with p; i.e. the demand function of permits is decreasing; (iii) z i increases with λ i , i.e. the larger λ i , the larger the effort assigned to reduce pollution; (iv) The demand function of permits expands as λ i decreases; (v) If all firms are initially equally treated by the regulator, i.e. q Ã i ¼ q Ã j and θ i ¼ θ j ; for every i and j in χ, then the environmentally more efficient firms (i.e. those firms with higher values of λ i ) sell permits to the environmentally less efficient ones.
Restrictive permit policy
The exact definition of a restrictive policy depends on whether we are considering autarky or the market, but in either case it captures the intuitive notion that all firms will be out of compliance with probability one.
Autarky
For the autarky case, we define restrictive policy as follows. For any i 2 χ, q Ã i is such that firm i has probability one of over-polluting for any possible internal resource allocation, that is,
Proposition 5 Consider an autarky scenario and an arbitrary firm i 2 χ with an environmental policy ðq Ã i ; θ i Þ satisfying eq. [7] . Then: (i) the environmental policy induces the efficient allocation if and only if
Þ , and z i is firm's optimal decision. In addition, the efficiency-inducing policy is such that (for all i 2 χ): (ii) θ i > δ ρ and (iii) θ i increases with λ i .
The condition in (i) means that the marginal disutility for the society of an increment in pollution (left-hand side) must be equal to the marginal disutility for an individual firm of an increment in pollution (right-hand side). From this expression, parts (ii) and (iii) describe the efficiency-inducing policy. In particular, part (ii) shows that the penalty parameter of the efficiency-inducing penalty is bounded below by the ratio of society's to firm's risk aversion parameter. Moreover, recall from Proposition 1 that at any efficient allocation, the society demands a larger abatement effort from the environmentally more efficient firms. Part (iii) states that the ER induces those firms to exert such a larger effort by imposing larger penalty terms on them.
The emission permits market
Under the market scenario we consider a situation in which, for any possible reassignment of permits performed at the market, any firm has probability one of over-polluting for any possible internal allocation of resources. Formally
where Q Ã denotes the total assignment of permits by the ER. In fact, what we require is that Q Ã is sufficiently low to induce that the demand of permits of each firm is such that each of them over-pollutes. In order to be able to compare the efficient environmental policies in each situation, we need to obtain closed-form expressions of the demand of permits. We shall use the following specific functional forms that satisfy the general properties of the functions stated in Section 2
where α > 0 is some exogenous parameter. The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 6 Consider a competitive market for permits and a generic firm i with environmental policy q
. Then: (i) The optimal decision of firm i is characterized by
(ii) There exists a unique equilibrium price, say p e ; (iii) There exists a unique efficiency-inducing market price, say p o ; (iv) A sufficient condition for p o ¼ p e to hold is
for every i 2 χ; (vi) There exist efficiency-inducing vectors of penalties Θ ¼ θ 1 ; . . . ; θ I ð Þothers than those satisfying eq.
[11], in particular: (a) Θ such that θ i < δ ρ for all firms except one, that is, for all i 2 χn j f g, where j is arbitrary in χ; (b) Θ such that θ i ¼ θ j for every i and j in χ.
Part (i) of proposition 6 illustrates that the previous general results on firms' behavior hold within this particular case. Parts (ii) and (iii) show technical -and desirable -properties of our model. . These two expressions are the inverse of the harmonic mean of the entries of Θ and of the squared entries, respectively. For the sake of interpretation of this result, consider a case with only two firms. Roughly, if we set the first term in eq.
Part (iv) characterizes efficiency-restoring vectors
[11] equal to one, we obtain θ À1 1 þ θ À1 2 ¼ #, for some constant #. Clearly, the pairs ðθ 1 ; θ 2 Þ that satisfy this latter equation conform a decreasing and strictly convex curve in the positive quadrant of the θ 1 θ 2 plane. It is an indifference curve for the society of efficiency-inducing pairs ðθ 1 ; θ 2 Þ, in which, as standard, convexity implies that the marginal rate of substitution diminishes as we move down along the curve. To keep things simple, in this two-firm example we do not take into account the central expression in eq. [11] . Including that term enforces to consider more than two firms in order to have more than one vector Θ satisfying eq. [11], while it does not change essentially the message on the substitution between θ's.
Moreover, notice that eq.
[11] does not contain α neither the vector of λ's. This means that our set of assumptions [9] and [10] provide a theoretical framework in which we can find efficiency-inducing environmental policies independent of the -eventually difficult to measure -technological parameters of the economy.
Parts (v) and (vi) of the previous proposition help us to compare the market with the autarky scenario. More concretely, part (v) states that the policies satisfying eq. [11] are of the same type of those in the autarky setting (see part (ii) of Proposition 5). However, part (vi) shows that, under a restrictive initial assignment of permits, the market widens the room to achieve efficiency along two dimensions. First, under the policy labeled (a) all firms but one are better off with the market (see again part (ii) of Proposition 5). That is, we are able to obtain efficiency at the market scenario with lower penalty levels for almost all firms. Second, the policy labeled (b) is informationally very cheap for the ER, since she does not need to know who is who among the polluting firms in order to set up an efficiency-inducing policy, 13 which contrasts with the autarky setting (see part (iii) of Proposition 5), where each penalty term is one-to-one linked to the λ's.
Permissive permit policy
Before we formally define permissive, let us introduce an additional assumption. In the remainder of this section, and for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of firms, say 0 and 1. 14 Formally, there are two real positive numbers, λ 0 and λ 1 , with λ 0 < λ 1 , such that
Thus, λ 0 and λ 1 define the inefficient and efficient types, respectively. Since any two firms of the same type are ex-ante identical, in what follows the subscript refers to type, whereas we keep no track of any individual firm hereafter. 15 Let I 0 and I 1 be the number of firms of each corresponding type, so that I 0 þ I 1 ¼ I. In addition, we maintain the functional forms specified in eq.
[10]. Of course, the efficient allocation in the two-type economy characterized by eqs [10] and [12] resembles the general properties of the efficient allocation presented for the more general case. The next result emphasizes this point and adds interesting properties of the efficient allocation in this scenario. Condition (i) has a straightforward interpretation. In order to avoid a specialization where the inefficient firms exert no environmental effort at the efficient allocation, the relative inefficiency of those firms should not be too large. Assertion (ii) is rather technical and (iii) just replicates Proposition 1. Most of the comparative statics results in parts (iv) and (v) are fairly intuitive. The most striking fact is that an increase in the abatement efficiency of the efficient firms increases the efficient environmental effort that the inefficient firms must exert. This result amounts to the idea that it is not socially optimal that the difference in the abatement efforts exerted by the two types of firms,
14 This assumption simplifies the expressions obtained but does not change any qualitative result of the paper. 15 In fact, there will be still ex-post differences among same-type firms as long as realized shocks differ across those firms, but that is irrelevant since decisions are undertaken ex-ante.
as firms are identical regarding the profitable activity. An increase in λ 1 (keeping λ 0 constant) increases z o 1 , which increases the difference in the abatement efforts, and the only way to reduce it is to increase z o 0 as well. Conversely, the previous result states that z o 1 decreases with λ 0 : the difference in the abatement efforts becomes smaller as the difference in efficiency, λ 1 À λ 0 , is reduced.
Next we turn our attention to the problem of characterizing efficiencyinducing environmental policies in which the amount of permits assigned by the regulator is relatively large. Specifically, we consider a case where each firm expects to pay no fine if it keeps exactly the permits assigned by the ER and exerts the efficient effort. Formally, for type i firms, this means
Therefore, if the distribution of permits is assigned following eq.
[13], given a two-type economy as described above, an environmental policy, either at the autarky or at the market scenario, is defined by a pair θ 0 ; θ 1 ð Þ.
Autarky
The main findings concerning the autarky setting are presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 8 Assume, in addition, that " is uniformly distributed with support ½" inf ; " sup and let us denote σ ¼ j" inf À " sup j. Then: (iii) There exists an efficiency-inducing environmental policy θ if and only if σ > 0, and it is defined by
The more remarkable statement of the previous result is part (i): the environmental policy that restores efficiency is not type specific. This is a widely observed fact in real life policy making: different polluters are assigned a different quantity of emission permits, typically based on historic emissions, but the unitary pollution penalty is common to all polluters. This simple twotype economy model rationalizes this fact and constitutes a theoretical scenario where, conditioned on a discrimination of permits assignment, it is efficient not to discriminate on the penalty parameter. Part (ii) is straightforward.
In part (iii) of the latter proposition we have added a distributional assumption on " that helps us to gain some intuition. It emphasizes an important characteristic of our model: for an efficiency-inducing environmental policy to exist, the probability distribution function of " must be non-degenerated, i.e. σ > 0. Contrarily, if it was degenerated, the abatement effort would be observable and the moral hazard problem would disappear. Finally, notice that the definition ofz conveys that it is efficient that the inefficient type firms pollute more and consequently receive a larger amount of permits at the autarky case. In addition, since E ejz o f g increases (linearly) withz, part (iii) shows that, as expected, the efficiency-inducing penalty parameter decreases with E ejz o f g.
The emission permits market
Clearly, the counterpart of eq.
[13] when a market for permits operates in the two-type economy is
The following result shows the basic properties of the efficiency-inducing environmental policy at the market scenario. Analogously to the autarky scenario, we shall restrict ourselves to policies where θ 0 ¼ θ 1 , as obtained in the previous subsection. Moreover, we shall focus on the analysis of strictly positive prices of the permits.
Proposition 9 Consider the two-type economy characterized by eqs [10] and [12] and a market scenario in which the supply of permits is given by eq.
[15]. If we restrict to environmental policies satisfying θ 0 ¼ θ 1 , then: (i) The individual demand function of permits is continuous and strictly decreasing for any p > 0. Moreover, for any such price, we have that Pr e i > q i jz i ð Þ> 0, where z i is the optimal decision of the firm; (ii) The value of θ that restores efficiency coincides with the one at the autarky case, presented in Proposition 8.
Part (i) of the previous proposition corroborates the general results in Proposition 4. Part (ii) shows that, when the ER assigns a large number of permits to be distributed in the market, then the environmental policy that she chooses in order to implement the efficient allocation is the same that the one she would have chosen at the autarky scenario. In other words, under a permissive policy the market does not allow the ER to lower (with respect to the autarky benchmark) the penalty term of any firm and neither to implement an informationally simpler efficiency-inducing environmental policy than under autarky. This conclusion contrasts with the results we obtained with the restrictive policy. As an overall statement, the lower the amount of permits, the larger the room the market has to reduce the informational requirements for the efficiencyinducing profile of penalty terms with respect to the corresponding one under autarky.
Conclusions
We have proposed a moral hazard model to analyze the implications of introducing a market for permits when an ER designs the environmental policy in order to achieve the efficient abatement effort on firms.
We have studied the efficiency-inducing environmental policy at an autarky situation (with no possibility of trading permits) and at the market scenario. To this purpose, we have distinguished between policies where the regulator assigns low permits (restrictive policies) and policies where the regulator distributes a large amount of permits (permissive policies). Roughly, the restrictive policy is characterized by the fact that each firm has probability one of overpolluting (and paying a small linear fine), even although each firm exerts the socially optimal level of abatement. In contrast, under a permissive policy, firms are expected not to over-pollute if they exert the socially optimal abatement effort.
When the policy is restrictive, we observe two important implications. First, at the autarky scenario, the environmental policy set up by the regulator to obtain efficiency must discriminate among agents, that is, those firms with a higher efficiency on the abatement technology face larger penalty terms in case of over-polluting. However, when a market for permits is allowed to operate, the market may simplify the efficiency-inducing environmental policy since the penalty term is the same for all polluting firms. Second, the existence of a market for permits also allows for efficiency-inducing profiles of penalty parameters that are firm specific. Within this set of firm-specific profiles, all firms but one might have a lower penalty parameter compared to its corresponding penalty parameter at the autarky case.
When we study permissive policies, the result is completely the opposite: there is no room for the market to help the regulator choosing efficiency-inducing policies where she does not need to know any specific information about firms. In this case, the efficiency-inducing environmental policy is the same at the autarky and at the market situation. All the discrimination among firms is given by the assignment of permits made by the regulator when choosing the environmental policy and the market does not provide any additional help.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this model opens different lines of research within the economics of information literature in which agents can trade contracts among themselves once those contracts have been initially assigned by the principal. In particular, this paper contributes to find in which situations it is interesting to add an adverse selection problem. We have shown that, under some circumstances, the regulator does not need to know any specific information about the firms to induce the efficient allocation. For the rest of the cases, if the abatement technology is private information to each firm, it will be interesting to study which type of contracts the regulator should design to induce efficiency. 1 2 δ 2 x 2 . The objective function of the problem that characterizes the efficient allocation of the economy is 
Take m i ¼ 1 À γðz i Þ, differentiate J with respect to z i and set the derivative equal to zero to obtain
The expression in part (i) of the proposition is straightforward from the previous expression. To prove part (ii), note that the right-hand side of eq.
[4] is constant across i's whereas its left-hand side increases monotonically with z o i and decreases monotonically with λ i . ■ Proof of Proposition 2. (i). Using z i as the unique decision variable and taking the second-order Taylor expansion for the exponential function, the first-order condition of firm i's problem is
Using Leibniz's rule, we have
and
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Substituting in the previous first-order condition and re-arranging terms, we obtain the desired expression. (ii). (ii.1) Differentiating the first-order condition obtained in Proposition 2 with respect to z i and θ i , and collecting terms we obtain
Since the terms multiplying dz i and dθ i are both positive (provided f 00 < 0, γ 00 !0, γ 0 > 0; and f 0 > 0), then we must have dzi dθ i > 0; and, therefore, we can conclude that the abatement effort of firm i increases with θ i (since both g and γ are increasing functions). Differentiating the first-order condition in Proposition 2 with respect to z i and q Ã i and collecting terms, we obtain
Since the terms multiplying dz i and dq
Comparing Proposition 1 to part (i), an efficiency-inducing policy ðq Ã i ; θ i Þ must satisfy 
there exists a unique value of θ i ; ¡ðq Ã i Þ that satisfies the first equality. Differentiability (and thus continuity) of ¡ follows trivially. Differentiating eq.
[16] with respect to q Ã i and θ i and collecting terms leads to
Since the terms multiplying dq Ã i and dθ i in the above expression have different signs, then ¡ is increasing. ■ Proof of Proposition 3. (i). The first-order condition with respect to z i mimics the corresponding one in Proposition 2 just replacing q Ã i by q i and t i by u i . Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to q i can be written as
Using Leibniz's rule, we have that
Substituting in the first-order condition and re-arranging terms, we obtain the expression in the proposition. [5] with respect to z i and p and collecting terms we obtain
Þ dp Use eq.
[5] to observe that Moral Hazard and Tradeable Pollution Emission Permits
Then, we have that
Þ dp
The expressions multiplying dz i and dp are both positive provided f 00 < 0 and γ 00 ! 0. Therefore dz i dp > 0 holds. (ii) Consider both equalities in eq.
[5]. When p increases, z i also increases, and, hence, u i also increases. Moreover, as u i increases, the integrals in eq.
[5] decrease. In summary, if q i remains constant as p increases, the term on the right in eq.
[5] decreases. On the other hand, this term decreases with q i . Therefore, p and q i must move in the opposite direction to satisfy eq. holds for all i 2 χn j f g, being j arbitrary in χ, which is part (a) of (vi). If M < 0 holds, we can still have k 0 > k 1 , and the subsequent argument follows. To prove part (b) of (vi) it suffices to let r ¼ θ i for all i 2 χ and to show that eq. [20] is a continuous function of r that tends to zero as r tends to 1 whereas it tends to 1 as r tends to zero. ■ Proof of Proposition 7. (i-iii) It is convenient to introduce the following notation:
for all i 2 0; 1 f g, where we must recall that the subscript i refers to type and not to a specific firm. Using eq.
[10] and the fact that the left-hand side of eq. [21] must be equal across types, we have
Note that eq.
[22] together with λ 0 < λ 1 implies part (iii) of the proposition. Using eq.
[22] we can write
After some algebra, these two previous expressions lead to
Using this expression, eq.
[21] for type 1 firms can be written
½23
The left-hand side of eq.
[23] increases with z 1 whereas the right-hand side decreases with z 1 . Thus, if there exists a solution in z 1 to eq.
[23], it is unique. In addition, such solution exists and lies in the interval ð0; 1Þ if and only if: (a) the left-hand side of eq.
[23] is smaller than the right-hand side at z 1 ¼ 0, and thus the solution is larger than zero, and (b) the left-hand side of eq.
[23] is larger than the right-hand side at z 1 ¼ 1, and thus the solution is smaller than 1. Condition (b) is
Notice that, since z 0 < z 1 holds, eq.
[24] ensures both z 1 < 1 and z 0 < 1. Condition (b) ensures z 1 > 0 but not z 0 > 0. Thus, we need to replace (a) with a stronger condition that ensures z 0 > 0. Using eq.
[22], we can write z 0 > 0 as z 1 >ẑ, whereẑ ¼ 2 1 À 1þλ0 1þλ1 . Since we have thatẑ > 0, z 1 >ẑ is stronger than condition (a). Therefore, replacing 0 withẑ in condition (a) leads to the following condition: (a′) the left-hand side of eq.
[23] is smaller than the right-hand side atẑ, and thus the solution is larger thanẑ. Condition (a′) ensures that z 0 > 0 and consequently z 1 > 0 holds. We can write (a′) as
Using ð2 ÀẑÞð1 þ λ 1 Þ ¼ 2ð1 þ λ 0 Þ within the left-hand side of the latter inequality and using ð1 þ λ 1 Þẑ ¼ 2ðλ 1 À λ 0 Þ within the right-hand side, we can write it as
Conditions [24] and [25] characterize the subset of parameter values for which the efficient interior solutions exist and are unique. Let us denote that subset by Ω. Next, we analyze the non-emptiness of Ω. First, since the interior efficient solution z 1 , defined by the solution to eq.
[23] in z 1 , must belong to the interval ðẑ; 1Þ, it must be the case thatẑ < 1. The latter inequality is equivalent to
This condition is thus necessary for Ω to be non-empty. We show that it is also sufficient. The previous assumptions imply that the right-hand side of eq.
[24] is strictly positive. Thus, there exists a unique value of α, say α Ã ; such that eq. [24] holds with equality. Replacing α by α Ã , we write eq.
[25] as 1 2
where we have denoted T 1 ¼ 2 Condition [26] implies that 1 2 1þλ 1 1þλ0 < 1. Therefore, for the previous inequality to hold, it suffices that δð1 þ δIT 1 Þ < δð1 þ δIT 2 Þ or, equivalently, T 1 < T 2 , but this latter inequality is equivalent to eq. [26] . The non-emptiness of Ω follows now trivially using a continuity argument on α. Furthermore, if, for every α satisfying both eqs [24] and [25] , we use a continuity argument on the rest of the parameters, we obtain that Ω has a non-zero measure along any dimension in α; I 0 ; I 1 ; λ 0 ; λ 1 ; δ; μ ð Þ , i.e. Ω has a non-empty interior. (iv and v) Write eq. [23] as where, for the latter equality, we have used the definition ofz. Using the latter expression into eq.
[15] to obtain the aggregate supply, the market clearing condition, after canceling out common terms on both sides, becomes κ À1 ðα=zÞ ¼ μ or, equivalently α z ¼ κðμÞ but the latter equation is exactly eq.
[27].
